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Dedication

Dedicated to Lauren, my twin sister and lifelong friend. You have always provoked,
supported, and enriched my intellectual and artistic pursuits. Thank you for inspiring me
to strive towards an Ideal, no matter how distant and impossible it may be.
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Abstract

This thesis will analyze the characteristics of the artist as an individual who attempts to
attain an aesthetic Ideal in which he believes he will find fulfillment. In the works of
E.T.A. Hoffmann, most notably Das Fräulein von Scuderi and Rat Krespel, the artists
René Cardillac and Rat Krespel not only fall short of this ideal, but also limit themselves
to the point that they cannot advance further without causing destruction in their own
lives. The failure of these artists is not due to their imperfections, but rather to their strict
adherence to German Idealist principles, which limit the artist in the manner by which he
strives toward the Ideal. Such limitations are incompatible with the societies in which
these artists live, resulting in the physical or metaphorical death of the artist. The
arguments in this thesis intend to reveal the Romantic artist’s condition as one of
continuous striving toward an aesthetic Ideal with a conscious awareness that the Ideal
can never be attained, thereby allowing the artist to progress in his journey in spite of
conflict and error. This thesis aims to prove that the Romantic concept of Unendlichkeit,
or the eternal acquisition of truth, should be the artist’s goal. If the artist can accept
Unendlichkeit as the aim of his artistic pursuits, then he will be able to find true
fulfillment in the continuous change and progression of his condition.
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Introduction
„Nicht die Kunst und die Werke machen den Künstler, sondern der Sinn und die
Begeisterung und der Trieb“ (Schlegel, „Lyceums-Fragmente“ 154). These words from
Friedrich Schlegel’s Lyceums-Fragmente characterize the artist not purely by the art that
he produces, but rather by the internal drive that results in the production of a work of art.
Schlegel’s sentiment reflects the interest that German Romanticism took in the role of the
artist within society. While the artist is a person who functions within society, he is led by
his ideals, which do not necessarily align with society’s standards. This conflict between
the artist and society is a theme that is often represented in the works of German
Romanticism.
German Romanticism has its philosophical roots in German Idealism. German
Idealism is the term used to describe the school of thought expressed primarily by Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel based on their interpretations of Kant’s aesthetic and metaphysical
principles in the 1790s. The term aesthetics comes from Greek, meaning “pertaining to
the senses.” Kant focused on the concept of the beautiful as something that brings
objective pleasure. This relationship to the beautiful, however, is only fused with the
finite condition. The German Idealists, on the other hand, saw aesthetics as the infinite
represented in finite form. Fichte attempted to fuse nature with consciousness into an
“Absolute I” so that being would be a harmonization of subjective and objective parts
(Bowie, German Philosophy 72). Fichte’s “Absolute I” consists of an I and a not-I, a
conscious and objective world, respectively. Schelling develops Fichte’s ideas further
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by maintaining that nature is not completely objective in that it is not in the absolute
control of the subjective being. The subjectivity of nature allows the thinking subject to
eventually come to a point of self-awareness in which it knows itself and can reflect back
on its progression toward self-consciousness. Recounting the progression toward selfconsciousness will result in the transcendental subject (Bowie, German Philosophy 7576). Hegel explained self-consciousness as a state of being in which the subject becomes
aware through its difference to the other (Bowie, German Philosophy 86). The Absolute
is considered to be the result of the thinking subject’s grasp of the truth that arises from
his unity within himself (Bowie, German Philosophy 83). German Idealism ultimately
views the Absolute as an ideal final destination by which all barriers between the subject
and its other have been surpassed by the subject’s efforts to understand itself and its other
and to find harmony between the parts, allowing the subject to discover truth in its being.
German Romanticism was a philosophical, literary, and artistic movement that
attempted to “combine within one critical gesture the dualism of the finite and the
infinite” (Schulte-Sasse 158). German Romanticism was initiated by a group of friends
who were based in Berlin and Jena between 1796 to about 1800. They included the
brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel, as well as authors Wilhelm
Wackenroder, Ludwig Tieck, Novalis, and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (Frank
27). Most of the early German Romantics were readers of Kant, and they were among the
first thinkers to seriously consider the place of history and politics within philosophy.
While German Romanticism has its foundation in German Idealism, it also made
significant departures from Idealism. Like the Idealists, the Romantics acknowledged that
art enabled the individual to contemplate his own self and his world in relation to an
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other. The Romantics began to deviate from German Idealism by denying the authority of
the Absolute I, which meant that anything done for the sake of an infinite purpose would
inevitably remain incomplete. While the Idealists focused on the goal of transcendence,
the Romantics focused more on the manner by which one strives toward transcendence.
Transcendence is the goal of a striving subject, but the striving subject is a knowing
subject, an empirical “I” that is conscious of its own surroundings. As a result, it is
characterized by its split or lack of unity, rendering its incompleteness as its inherent
condition. One of the Romantic thinkers, Friedrich Schlegel, understood aesthetics to be a
creative impulse that consisted of combinatory experimentation. Combinatory
experimentation is simply a creative mixing of various fields of knowledge, a concept
that becomes a driving force in striving toward absolute knowledge. This methodology as
the path toward absolute knowledge signifies the artist to be a pursuer of a higher, ideal
truth. While the truth itself is a noble ideal, the artist must take care to focus on the
process of striving rather than the point at which he will attain the state in which he will
reach absolute knowledge. Since striving is a process, there are activities associated with
that process. The German Romantics saw artistic representation as an integral part of the
progression toward truth, making the artist, whether he is a visual, musical, or literary
artist, to be the quintessential striving subject.
Friedrich Schlegel expresses the view „Wo die Philosophie aufhört, muß die
Poesie anfangen“ (Schlegel, „Athenäums-Fragmente“ 261). These words emphasize the
Romantic principle of art as the primary vehicle by which a person can progress as a selfknowing being. With this standard as the foundation of German Romanticism, it is no
surprise that the era produced artists with a distinct consciousness of their ideals as
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artists, but also with an awareness of their own limitations. One such artist was a man
from Prussia named Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann. Hoffmann was born in the year
1776 in the town of Königsberg. Throughout the course of his life he actively engaged in
various arts, including music, drawing, and writing. In his youth, Hoffmann studied and
worked in the legal profession. This was followed by a period in which he was a free
artist working as a composer, a director for a theater, and a set painter. Once he achieved
recognition for his operatic and other musical contributions, he developed his literary
career with stories that often had fantastical elements that seemed to surpass the limits of
reality. These stories began to appear in print from 1814 until his death in 1822, around
the time that German Idealism and the Romantic response to it were already well under
way.
Hoffmann’s basic biographical information indicates the conflicted condition of a
man who had to deal with the opposing realities of his two vocations, the legal profession
and art. Hoffmann’s education and first chosen career suggest that he tried to be a
rational, responsible citizen who must financially support himself. His artistic side, on the
other hand, implies a love for uncertainty and chaos to the point that his writings reflect a
partial break from the realities of everyday life. Hoffmann also placed emphasis on the
artist as a character in many of his stories. Hoffmann’s artists are men who are
autonomous individuals, possess a dual character, and are conflicted in their impulses in
relation to the societies in which they live. For this reason, they are outsiders who have a
perception of truth that differs from that of society. Considering that Hoffmann had
exposure to Kant, German Idealism, and German Romanticism during his formative
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years, it is not surprising that Hoffmann chose to focus on the artist as an idealistic being
whose expectations of realizing the Absolute have tragic consequences.
The purpose of this thesis is to prove how Hoffmann’s portrayal of the striving
artist with uncompromising Idealist goals ultimately fails under German Romanticism,
and how this failure advocates the artist as a figure who must embrace his ideals as well
as his flaws. The artist figures portrayed in the novellas Das Fräulein von Scuderi (1819)
and Rat Krespel (1818) both strive toward the Absolute through their art, but make the
error of allowing the extreme needs of their idealist views of art to get in the way of the
reality of their finite human condition, thereby disrupting the balance that German
Idealism claims must be maintained within the individual in order to achieve a state of
fulfillment. As a result, disaster occurs.
In the first chapter, I will discuss Hoffmann’s artist René Cardillac from the
novella Das Fräulein von Scuderi. Cardillac is an artist who strives toward an idealistic
end in which he achieves totality by becoming the sole possessor of his works of art. A
goldsmith by profession, his main problem is that the art he creates is by commission,
and he is obligated to allow his customers to walk away with his pieces of jewelry since
he must make a living from his art. Unable to cope with the idea that another person will
be in possession of one of his creations, Cardillac believes he is driven to the act of
murder in order to retrieve his art from its owners and to make himself whole once more.
Possessing a double-nature which compels him to kill while simultaneously living out his
life as a virtuous citizen, Cardillac believes that his behavior is ruled by an evil star and
that he has no control over his destructive impulses. By refusing to acknowledge control
over his actions, Cardillac does not see his predicament as ironic, and is therefore unable
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to maintain a balance between his creative and his destructive drives. Without this
balance, the destructive drive overpowers Cardillac’s conflicted condition, resulting in his
death. Cardillac’s pursuit of totality and rejection of irony in his artistic life, both Idealist
aims, ultimately result in his destruction.
The second chapter will focus on the titular character from Rat Krespel. Krespel,
a man who is legal counselor by profession and a violinist and violin builder by hobby,
appears to be a man of opposing natures. He is grounded in reason, but also possesses a
creative side. Krespel’s creative nature inspires him to incorporate art into his everyday
life. His art is made most clearly manifest in the violins he builds from deconstructed
pieces of old violins. Like Cardillac, Krespel creates objects that are not usually
considered to be works of art. Cardillac’s personal attachment to his jewelry and
Krespel’s to his violins allow both of their creations to rise to the level of art. This fact
implies that the artist lives through his creations, while individuals who do not are
craftsmen at best. Krespel’s artistic activity acts as a way for him to suppress the
malicious side of his nature, a side which is revealed in his treatment of his wife when
she interrupts his attempts to creatively transcend his present situation. Later in life,
Krespel finally gets glimpse of the Absolute, but attempts to restrain it. When it cannot be
restrained, Krespel is forced to accept the Absolute in the form of a transcendental
experience. Krespel’s true failure results from his denial of the Other in art, which
disrupts the balance he is supposed to maintain between the finite and the infinite. This
causes Krespel to view a transcendental experience as an end-all for himself. By
believing that he has reached the end point in all of his artistic striving, Krespel falls into
a state of apathy in which he feels no need to discover truth via the creation of new
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violins. In a way, he is resigning himself to a living death and denying the possibility of
progressing further.
In addition to the aforementioned Hoffmann novellas, other sources that will aid
in the discussion of this topic include many of the philosophical works of the German
Idealist and German Romantic eras. Hegel’s Ästhetik is a collective work of Hegel’s
academic lectures in Heidelberg in 1818 and Berlin from 1820-1821, 1823, 1826 and
1828-1829. His 1821 Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts will also be consulted for
additional principles on the concept of freedom within the finite world. Schelling’s
System des transzendentalen Idealismus, published in 1800, will be used to describe
transcendence from an Idealist perspective. Since German Idealism attempts to explain
Kant’s philosophy in terms of aesthetics within both the finite and infinite states of being,
Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft will only be minimally discussed for basic aesthetic
principles rather than a complete view on Kant’s philosophy in relation to the artist.
Friedrich Schiller’s 1795 Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen: in einer Reihe
von Briefen is one of the first responses to Kant and it subsequently applies the Kantian
principles of aesthetics to the human condition.
Works written on the philosophy and literature of German Romanticism include
Manfred Frank’s The Philosophical Foundation of Early German Romanticism, which
discusses the development of German Romanticism in relation to Kantian philosophy and
German Idealism, with a focus on Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel’s contributions.
Andrew Bowie’s An Introduction to German Philosophy discusses German Idealism with
a focus on Fichte’s, Schelling’s, and Hegel’s interpretations of Kantian philosophy.
Bowie’s work additionally attempts to draw conclusions concerning the manner in which
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early German Romanticism made departures from German Idealism, and how the concept
of the Absolute was eventually acknowledged as a nullification of what is possible in the
finite world. Jochen Schulte-Sasse’s Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early
German Romantic Writings gives a summary of the theories of various Romantic
philosophers in relation to how they interpreted the Idealists and one another.
Through the analysis of Hoffmann’s novellas within the context of the goals of
German Idealism versus the more realistic aims of German Romanticism, I hope to bring
the reader to an understanding of Hoffmann’s perspective on the artist’s condition. The
artist is a conflicted person with pure goals and the belief that the application of his ideals
to his condition in reality will make him capable of achieving his goals. While we
idealistically wish to believe that noble pursuits are enough to get us through the
paradoxes of our being, Hoffmann uses his artists to show that an idealistic end is not
possible. He instead allows his idealistic artists to die, either physically or symbolically,
when they believe that they have reached the destination of all of their striving. They die
because they fail their true goal, that is, to never cease in striving.
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Chapter 1: Das Fräulein von Scuderi
Hoffmann’s novella, Das Fräulein von Scuderi, explores the condition of the Romantic
artist who is striving for an idealistic end through acts of murder, which eventually
culminate in his own destruction. The artist in question is René Cardillac, a renowned
Parisian jeweler during the reign of Louis XIV. In spite of his renown as a goldsmith with
extraordinary talent, Cardillac is an outsider in a society that has superficial appreciation
for art. Hoffmann employs the frivolities of the court of the Sun King to set Cardillac
apart from the other artists in this fictional version of Paris. The depiction of the other
Parisian artists is generally negative; they are not artists who are dedicated to an ideal in
art, but rather producers of witty nothings that are intended to amuse the king. This point
is made clear in the poetical petition that is sent to the king to appeal to him to give a new
crime tribunal greater powers to track down and punish those responsible for the knife
murders in the streets of Paris. The petition is amusing, but is described in the following
to lack substance beyond that of mere entertainment:
So ernst die Sache auch war, so fehlte es diesem Gedicht doch nicht,
vorzüglich in der Schleichwege zur Geliebten sich ängstigen müssten, wie
die Angst schon alle Liebeslust, jedes schöne Abenteuer der Galanterie im
Aufkeimen töte, an geistreich-witzigen Wendungen. Kam nun noch hinzu,
dass beim Schluss alles in einen hochtrabenden Panegyrikus auf Ludwig
den XIV. ausging so konnte es nicht fehlen, dass der König das Gedicht
mit sichtlichen Wohlgefallen durchlas. (660)
The king had previously refused the design to create a new tribunal out of the fear that
the current tribunal was already abusing the power it held. The petition that the artists
create for the king is a work of art that is produced with the purpose of pleasing the
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king by superficial means to change his mind on the matter. While the request of the
artists is reasonable, the excessive exultation of the king clearly has the intent of stroking
his ego to prompt him into action rather than adopting an elevated aesthetic quality that
would move him on a deeper level. The king, however, appears to be aware of the
superficial methods of these courtly artists to the degree that he consults his mistress, the
Marquise de Maintenon, on the poem. Her answer, however, proves to be unsatisfactory
to the king, who claims that „Die Marquise mag nun einmal von den Galanterien unserer
verliebten Herren nichts wissen, und weicht mir aus auf Wegen, die nichts weniger als
verboten sind“ (661). Instead of influencing the king in an aesthetic manner that would
allow him to act with conviction, whether that conviction is to increase the power of the
police or to leave the situation as it currently is, the Marquise and the artists appeal to the
king in words that they feel will please the king enough to achieve their personal goals.
The art described here violates the Romantic concept of art for art’s sake. This concept,
defined by Kant as „Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck“ (Kant 143), emphasizes aesthetic
representation as free, disinterested, and contemplative. The artists who make the petition
do so with a direct aim that influences the manner in which they deliver their artistic
creation, depriving it of the necessary aesthetic authenticity that would allow the king’s
decision to be objectively determined. Scuderi, a poetess, counters this poetical petition
with lines of verse that are not meant to flatter the king, but are meant to artistically
elevate the ideal of the chivalric lover in the face of inevitable danger. She claims that
lovers who are not willing to risk danger for the sake of love are not worthy of love. In
reaction to these lines, the king is described as „ganz erstaunt über den ritterlichen Geist
dieser wenigen Worte, die das ganze Gedicht mit seinen ellenlangen Tiraden zu Boden
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schlugen“ (661). The king’s admiration of Scuderi’s words shows her art, which
represents an absolute in that it is spontaneous and unafraid of censure from its boldness,
stands in stark contrast to that of the artists who only tailor their art to a form that serves
the shallow intent of pleasing the king.
Cardillac establishes his role as a true artist by his reaction to the lines that
Scuderi composes for the king. It is upon hearing of these lines that Cardillac goes home,
celebrates, and endeavors to create his finest piece of work for Scuderi, whom he
acknowledges to be a true artist of the same caliber as himself. Cardillac has the jewelry
sent to Scuderi out of pure admiration and respect for her as an idealized artist. Cardillac
makes this point clear when he explains to Scuderi how he came about making the piece,
stating, „Bloß der schönen Arbeit willen suchte ich meine besten Steine zusammen, und
arbeitete aus Freude daran fleißiger und sorgfältiger als jemals... ich [dachte] während der
Arbeit an Euch“ (668). The first part of this explanation shows how Cardillac created one
of his best works simply for the sake of creating a beautiful piece of art. This act is truly
„Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck“ since Cardillac gains nothing by impressing Scuderi.
This view is strengthened by the fact that he originally had the jewelry sent to her
anonymously. It is out of appreciation for Scuderi’s pure character as an artist that moves
Cardillac to create the work and give it to her in spite of his usual reluctance to let go of
any of his work.
Cardillac is also an artist with a two-sided character that is incompatible with the
society in which he belongs. This duality of character means that Cardillac struggles
against two extremes; that of the virtuous citizen and that of the murdering demon. Even
before the reader is introduced to the nature of Cardillac’s clandestine activities, there is
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evidence of his double-nature in the most basic description of the jeweler: „Wäre
Cardillac nicht in ganz Paris als der rechtlichste Ehrenmann, uneigennützig, offen, ohne
Hinterhalt, stets zu helfen bereit, bekannt gewesen, sein ganz besonderer Blick aus
kleinen, tiefliegenden, grün funkelnden Augen hätten ihn in den Verdacht heimlicher
Tücke und Bosheit bringen können“ (664). From this description, Cardillac comes across
as a man who preserves an external appearance of playing the role of the good citizen; he
is revered by society as a decent man with a family and an honorable profession in which
he is a master. If not for his reputation, a casual observer might have the initial
impression that Cardillac has diabolical leanings. Even Cardillac himself, when
confronted by his obsession with the jewelry he makes and the murderous consequences
of this obsession, struggles to find a middle ground between the two extremes. Every
commission he accepts is done so with „brennender Begierde“ (665), but once the work
is completed, „war es kaum möglich, die fertige Arbeit von ihm zu erhalten“ (665).
Cardillac’s struggle has reached a point that he refuses commissions to people, a refusal
that is only reversed once he takes a look at the jewels and his artistic mind envisions the
beautiful work of art that could be created from them. It is also possible that Cardillac’s
place in a society that requires a completed product in exchange for money obliges him to
submit to his customers and let them walk away with the creations that he views as
rightfully belonging to him. This struggle between the reality of a man who dwells in a
society that does not understand his attachment to his works of art, and the ideal of the
artist who has the irresistible drive to make a beautiful work of art for the sake of making
it characterizes Cardillac as the Romantic artist who is striving for an Ideal in art while
dwelling in the finite reality of a society overrun by shallow artists.
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1.1 TOTALITY OF BEING
The German Idealist thinker Hegel views the truth as a concept which can be
represented in individuals as a totality that marks man in his concrete spirituality and its
subjectivity. This means that the individual consists of various aspects of character that
must function as a unified whole. Additionally, it is in ideal artistic representation that
character is able to combine these aspects. Hegel explains that once the individual
combines the parts of his character with his subjectivity, he will be a determinate figure,
meaning that he will be able to develop according to essential traits that master the
emotions via rationality and free will. Once the individual knows himself, he can reach a
unity that has the potential to achieve an infinite condition, as described by the
observation „Ist der Mensch nicht in dieser Weise eins in sich, so fallen die
verschiedenen Seiten der Mannigfaltigkeit sinnlos und gedankenlos auseinander. Mit sich
in Einheit zu sein, macht in der Kunst gerade das Unendliche und Göttliche der
Individualität aus“ (Hegel, Ästhetik I 236-37). This totality is meant to come from
different parts, but not from oppositions. Hegel admits that the focus on individual parts
while elevating the concept of the unity appears to be a contradiction, but he argues that
„die ideelle Einheit ist nicht, nur nicht das sinnliche Außereinander, in welchem jede
Besonderheit ein selbstständiges Bestehen und abgeschlossene Eigentümlichkeit hat,
sondern sie ist das direkt Entgegengesetzte solcher äußerlichen Realität“ (Hegel, Ästhetik
I 125). In this way, the whole should be seen as a living organism with both external and
internal functions. The importance of individual parts should never be seen as separate
from the whole, but rather an essential function of the whole that cannot be maintained
without its place in the whole. Hegel elaborates this point further with a brief comparison
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of the united totality of the individual, described by Hegel to be the soul itself, with
organic members of the living body. While the members of the body have their own
individuality in the sense that they have functions that are unique to their features, they
cannot subsist in their function alone, as described in the following:
Der Lebensprozeß umfaßt die gedoppelte Tätigkeit: einerseits stets die
realen Unterschiede aller Glieder und Bestimmtheiten des Organismus zur
sinnlichen Existenz zu bringen, anderseits aber, wenn sie in
selbstständiger Besonderung erstarren und gegeneinander zu festen
Unterschieden sich abschließen wollen, an ihnen ihre allgemeine Idealität,
welche ihre Belebung ist, geltend to machen... Durch diese Einheit der
gedoppelten Tätigkeit sind alle Glieder des Organismus stets erhalten und
stets die Idealität ihrer Belebung zurückgenommen. Die Glieder zeigen
diese Idealität denn auch sogleich darin, dass ihnen ihre belebte Einheit
nicht gleichgültig, sondern im Gegenteil der Substanz ist, in welcher und
durch welche sie allein ihre besondere Individualität bewahren können.
(Hegel, Ästhetik I 125-26)
Hegel further illustrates the importance of the united whole over the separate parts by
pointing out how a part that is completely separated from the whole will ultimately lose
its function within the unity, as noted by the rationale „Die Hand, z. B., abgehauene,
verliert ihr selbstständiges Bestehen; sie bleibt nicht, wie sie im Organismus war, ihre
Regsamkeit, Bewegung, Gestalt, Farbe usf. verändert sich; ja, sie geht in Fäulnis über
und ihre ganze Existenz löst sich auf. Bestehen hat sie nur als Glied des Organismus,
Realität nur als stets in die ideelle Einheit zurückgenommen“ (Hegel, Ästhetik I 126). In
this sense, Hegel views the united whole as uncompromising ideal. This means that
anything that could be cast off from the whole would make the whole incomplete since
Hegel’s whole consists of „Glieder“ that are fused to the host and not simply of „Teile“
that could be collected and discarded at will without leaving the host broken both
internally and externally. The cast off parts will die and become useless to the individual.
This aspect of totality especially applies to art since the soul is made manifest in a work
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of art, and the work of art helps the spirit turn back into its inner self. This form of
objective idealism aids the artist in arriving at a state of self-consciousness that is also
idealized.
In Das Fräulein von Scuderi, René Cardillac is an artist who is consumed with
totality through the possession of his works of art. As an artist, Cardillac labors endlessly
at his works of art until they have reached his idea of perfection. Once he has achieved
this state, he sees the jewelry as more meaningful to him than they could ever be to the
customers who have requested the jewelry in the first place. The significance that each
piece of jewelry has for Cardillac is reflected in the relentless effort to mold it into
perfection once he has obtained the materials for the work from his customers:
Dann ließ ihm das Werk keine Ruhe, Tag und Nacht hörte man ihn in
seiner Werkstatt hämmern und oft, war die Arbeit beinahe vollendet,
missfiel ihm plötzlich die Form, er zweifelte an der Zierlichkeit
irgendeiner Fassung der Juwelen, irgendeines kleinen Häkchens - Anlass
genug, die ganze Arbeit wieder in den Schmelztiegel zu werfen und von
neuen anzufangen. So wurde jede Arbeit ein reines, unübertreffliches
Meisterwerk, das den Besteller in Erstaunen setzte. (665)
Cardillac does not only work at perfecting a work of art, but also has the desire to
permanently keep each piece of jewelry he makes. Every time a customer returns to him
to collect a piece of jewelry that he ordered from Cardillac, the jeweler will only let go of
the piece after entreaties and protestations will not abate the customer in his insistence on
collecting the piece. Cardillac’s ready acceptance of commissions to work on a piece of
jewelry upon seeing the jewels, versus his refusal to give up the jewelry when he has
labored upon it and finished it, makes it clear that something has changed in Cardillac’s
relationship to the jewels. Somewhere in the process of converting those materials to
works of art in the form of beautiful jewelry, Cardillac has developed an attachment to
the jewels, almost as if they are parts of his body. This claim may seem outrageous to the
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average observer, but Cardillac’s assistant, Olivier, has been exposed to the depth of
Cardillac’s drive and has been told by the master craftsman what the jewelry means to
him, which is explained in the following excerpt of Cardillac’s story within Olivier’s
narrative:
Sowie [Cardillac] ein Geschmeide gefertigt und abgeliefert, fiel
[Cardillac] in eine Unruhe, in eine Trostlosigkeit, die [ihm] Schlaf,
Gesundheit - Lebensmut raubte. - Wie ein Gespenst stand Tag und Nacht
die Person, für die [Cardillac] gearbeitet, [ihm] vor Augen, geschmückt
mit [Cardillacs] Geschmeide, und eine Stimme raunte [ihm] in die Ohren:
‚Es ist ja dein - es ist ja dein - nimm es doch - was sollen die Diamanten
dem Toten!‘ (692-93)
Cardillac’s reaction to the idea that another person will own a piece of work that he sees
as belonging to him is severe; he appears to deteriorate physically and mentally. It is as if
a “member” of his body has been cut off, leaving him as a lesser being than he was
before. As the last part of the quote emphasizes, Cardillac’s insistence that his jewelry
should belong to no one other than him leads him to drastic measures to maintain a sense
of totality: he murders his customers in the dark of the night and steals back his jewelry.
Cardillac sees his act of murder as the only means to retain his sense of totality. Proof
that he feels whole once again upon committing the murder and repossessing the jewelry
is evident from his remark to Olivier „[Den Mord] getan fühlte ich eine Ruhe, eine
Zufriedenheit in meiner Seele, wie sonst niemals. Das Gespenst war verschwunden, die
Stimme des Satans schwieg“ (694). This initial positive reaction to an act that would be
expected to fill the average person with horror implies that Cardillac has just as much to
lose by letting his customers walk away with his works of art than he does by having his
own hand cut off.
From the perspective of German Idealism, Cardillac’s pursuit for totality is
completely justified. Cardillac is attempting to reach some type of Absolute through art
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and murders to possess that art indefinitely. As an autonomous artist, Cardillac
understands the value of his own work, and it can even be argued that Cardillac’s idea of
art is unselfish. He sees his works as pure pieces that hold an irreplaceable aesthetic
value. Unlike the idea of the „Mordband“ that the Parisians think are responsible for the
murder and theft jewelry from Cardillac’s customers, Cardillac is not looking to obtain
material wealth. Instead, Cardillac’s desire to obtain the jewelry is for himself alone. He
is not looking to be rich nor is he looking to use the jewelry in any manner other than to
keep his members attached to his person. Without these members, he does not consider
himself to be a whole person, and this seems to be preventing him from reaching a
satisfactory destination in his life. Cardillac’s motives are in stark contrast to the band of
poisoners that are led by Sainte Croix and the Marquise de Brinvillier, who have no real
aim in their efforts to poison others since they do it „Ohne weiterem Zweck, aus reiner
Lust... haben oft Giftmörder Personen gemordet, deren Leben oder Tod ihnen völlig
gleich sein konnte“ (654) Cardillac is not killing for the sake of killing, but rather to
preserve his aesthetic Self within the paradigm of his image of the Ideal.
Nevertheless, Cardillac’s path to totality via murder has destructive consequences.
The jeweler goes out one night in pursuit of one of his customers with the intent to repeat
his pattern of killing in order to take back one of his “members.” Instead of the usual
success that Cardillac has enjoyed, he becomes the victim of his own dagger when his
intended victim turns on him in self-defense. In this way, Cardillac is suddenly cut off
from the realization of an ideal state since he is dead, and the aftermath of his death
results in his secrets being discovered and the stolen pieces of jewelry that he so
painstakingly recovered to be returned to their intended owners or to be donated to a
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church. Even Cardillac’s wish that his jewelry be destroyed after his death is not honored,
allowing his body to be desecrated as its members are scattered throughout the city to be
put to use by others rather than procuring a suitable resting place away from the aims of
those unworthy people who did not devote themselves to the works of art that he valued.
Cardillac’s role as an artist who appears to be in pursuit of totality to such an
extreme that his methods work against him in a destructive manner appears to be a
criticism of Idealism in art. While it is important that an artist is bound to his work to the
point that he strives toward fulfillment and perfection in artistic representation, fusing his
existence with his art has destructive consequences. Not only does Cardillac's fusion with
his art cause him to view the lives of others as necessary sacrifices in the pursuit of his
own sense of totality, but he also loses at his own game by being killed by the same
method through which he aspires to reach that end goal of totality. In Das Fräulein von
Scuderi the point of totality is never truly achieved since Cardillac moves on after every
killing with yet another cycle of creation, a feeling of emptiness from the knowledge that
his creation cannot indefinitely belong to him, followed by the act of murder in order to
come back to a sense of totality. At the same time, it is clear that Cardillac’s idea of
totality is somewhat skewed: he is apparently never whole since he is eager to create yet
again rather than to revel in a sense of totality that would take away the need to create.
Without this need, Cardillac would be able to claim himself completely whole.
Romanticism, on the other hand, supports the idea that totality is only a concept and not
an actualization, as reflected in Friedrich Schlegel’s observation that the individual can
never exist as a totality, but rather only envisions totality to the degree that the individual
is perpetually incomplete (Frank 189). Hoffmann’s representation of Cardillac proves
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that the striving artist, in spite of claims that he has reached a sense of totality through
creation and the maintenance of the concept of the whole, is in reality not whole. The
pursuit of the whole to such extremes, however, can only have destructive consequences
since it is clear that the artist’s idealism is incompatible with reality. For this reason, even
the prospect of the artist achieving totality of character does not provide a satisfying
conclusion to Cardillac’s acts of murder.
1.2 REJECTION OF IRONY
Hegel viewed irony as a concept that had no place in aesthetics since irony is the
result of the ego transforming an objective concept into subjective matter. Hegel defines
irony as an „unendliche absoluter Negativität“ (Ästhetik I 76). This means that irony
ceases at the end of the system because all of the negatives in the system eventually lead
to the positive recognition that one has exhausted negativity. In this way, negativity is the
path to truth. According to Hegel, irony cannot be a component of the striving individual
since irony is the nullification of anything of worth to the individual’s character.
In a manner reminiscent of Hegel, Cardillac displays a rejection of the concept of
irony in his actions with the concept of his „böser Stern“. Cardillac’s „angeborener
Trieb“ (692), which he believes to be the force that has determined his artistic drive and
his fate, pushes Cardillac to commit seemingly contradictory acts without irony. On the
one hand, Cardillac is driven to create beautiful pieces of jewelry and yet, on the other
hand, he is seemingly compelled to destroy the lives of their rightful owners. Cardillac
does not speak about contradictions, but of an inborn need to be near his art. Cardillac
tells Olivier the story of his own mother's pregnancy. In the first month of the pregnancy,
she danced with a former lover of hers who was wearing a beautiful diamond necklace.
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The lover died as the mother of Cardillac had reached for the necklace, leaving her in a
state of agitation that made her ill to the point that her family feared for the life of the
unborn child. Cardillac attaches much personal significance to the story, and claims that
he had been directly affected by the event when he was in the womb: „Aber die
Schrecken jenes fürchterlichen Augenblicks hatten mich getroffen. Mein böser Stern war
aufgegangen und hatte den Funken hinabgeschossen, der in mir eine der seltsamsten und
verderblichsten Leidenschaften entzündet“ (692). Cardillac believes that his obsession
with jewelry is related to the event. Having only been in the womb and therefore unable
to resist the shock he received from the event, Cardillac sees himself as a victim of fate
with no control over his drive. Cardillac’s conviction that his actions are ruled by fate
reach an extreme so intense that even the reader can question to what extent Cardillac is
responsible for his actions. Without control, there is no irony. In this way, Hegel’s
principle of irony is fulfilled in that a series of negations lead to a single positive at the
end of the system. The acts of murder, which are typically seen as subjective, are now
objective since „kein Widerstand ist möglich“ (691). Cardillac maintains this objectivity
with the words „Es ist mir dann sogar, als ob das, was der böse Stern begonnen durch
mich, meiner unsterblichen Seele, die daran keinen Teil hat, zugerechnet werden könne“
(696). With this logic, Cardillac completely rejects the idea that he is responsible for his
actions, thereby ignoring any possibility for irony to be at work in his being.
Cardillac’s rejection of irony in relation to his own actions is problematic in terms
of German Romanticism. While Hegel decries irony as a selfish concept that cannot
function in the self-conscious individual, the German Romantics felt that irony was
essential in art. Since the ideal state of being is beyond opposition, irony is „die Form
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des Paradoxen“ (Schlegel, „Lyceums-Fragmente“ 153) that consists of the „Gefühl von
dem unauflöslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des Bedingten, der Unmöglichkeit
und Notwendigkeit einer vollständigen Mitteilung“ (Schlegel, „Lyceums-Fragmente“
160). This means that Romantic irony assists the artist by helping him adopt “an ironic
attitude toward [the artist] and the Ideal, [so that] it becomes easier for [the artist] to
accept the impasse that confronts him. Accordingly the artist attempts to inhabit a
standpoint outside of himself from which the world of reality might be transcended in an
aesthetic world of appearances (“Schein”)” (Röder 15). Since the Romantic artist
fluctuates between oppositions, there is much pressure on the artist to fulfill one or the
other of those extremes constantly. Irony provides the artist with a way to deal with these
extremes so he does not go mad. Under Hegel’s system, Cardillac does not vacillate, but
rather denies that his obsession with jewels is within his control in the first place. This
results in a tangible act of madness, that is, murdering his patrons by plunging a knife
into their hearts. The act of stabbing the heart, an organ that has a figurative association
with the emotional depth of the soul, appears to reflect the personal nature of the crime
on Cardillac’s part. He is not only trying to kill their living bodies, but also to deliberately
destroy their spirit, almost as if they should not live on in the infinite state of being. It is
not the morality of the act that is the issue here; even the German Romantics did not see
morality as having a place in irony. Irony, from their perspective, is not about what is
right or wrong, but is more of a matter of coming up with new and better ways to dealing
with the conflicting aspects of being, because being itself transcends what we know of it.
Cardillac clearly has a conflicted nature; he is living a double-life of the virtuous citizen
and the murderer in the dark alley. He cannot bear the thought of committing acts of
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murder, but also cannot resist the urge to take any action necessary to repossess his works
of art.
Cardillac does attempt to view his contradictory acts ironically by idolizing
Scuderi as a Madonna figure. He approaches Olivier one day and praises Scuderi’s poetic
lines to the king, revealing at the same time that „[Cardillac] [Scuderi] von jeher verehrt
habe, wie sonst kein menschliches Wesen, und daß [Scuderi], mit solch hoher Tugend
begabt, vor der der böse Stern kraftlos erbleiche, selbst den schönsten von [Cardillac]
gefertigten Schmuck tragend, niemals ein böses Gespenst, Mordgedanken in ihm erregen
würdet [sic]“ (695). It is clear that Cardillac sees Scuderi as a type of saintly intercessor
who can help him from the conundrum of his „böser Stern“. He sends her his finest work,
a necklace and bracelets made out of rubies. Cardillac admits that even the task of
making a diamond crown for a statue of the Holy Virgin in one of the Parisian churches
is not enough to quell the demonic voices of his evil star. Instead, it is when he thinks of
Scuderi that „ist es [Cardillac], als wenn [Cardillac] der Tugend und Frömmigkeit selbst
demutsvoll ein Opfer bring[t] und wirksame Fürsprache erfleh[t], indem [Cardillac]
Scuderi der schönsten Schmuck sende[t], den [Cardillac] jemals gearbeitet“ (696).
Cardillac’s acknowledgment of Scuderi as a saint who is worthy of permanently
possessing his greatest work without the consequence of becoming his next victim
indicates Cardillac’s high degree of trust in outlying forces on his life. In his mind,
Cardillac’s drive to kill will be resolved since his sacrifice of the jewelry will ultimately
end the influence of his evil star over him. Scuderi, acting as a saint, will be able to
conquer the forces of evil for him, releasing Cardillac of all responsibility of what
happens to him later on, good or bad. The supposed solution to Cardillac’s problem is
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only a temporary one. It is not long after Olivier has delivered the jewels to Scuderi that
he begins to notice Cardillac’s behavior resembles that of a mad man:
Da geschah es, daß Cardillac plötzlich alle Munterkeit verlor. Er schlich
trübe umher, starrte vor sich hin, murmelte unverständliche Worte, focht
mit den Händen, Feinliches von sich abwehrend, sein Geist schien gequält
von bösen Gedanken... nun wußt ich, daß sein irrer Geist wieder erfasst
war, von dem abscheulichen Mordgespenst, daß des Satans Stimme
wieder laut worden vor seinen Ohren. (696)
Even the knowledge that his holy virgin possesses his finest work is not enough to
contain him. Cardillac, who tries to shift from the extreme of a deadly murderer to the
extreme of the bearer of a precious gift to a saint figure, cannot maintain a middle ground
between the two. Cardillac also believes that he cannot control the madness he
experiences when he targets Scuderi in order to repossess the jewels. By refusing to
acknowledge irony in the situation, Cardillac sets out to kill Scuderi and meets his own
death. Cardillac could have saved himself by acknowledging his capacity for control over
the situation and by finding some way to maintain the balance between the oppositions in
his nature via art. It is Cardillac’s denial of irony in favor of an Idealist tendency to view
the world in irreconcilable extremes, however, that diminishes the possibility that the
change will come from Cardillac himself.
If Cardillac had found irony as a way to cope with the aspects of being that make
him an obsessive creator who must also eternally possess his works of art, he would have
been able to strive continuously toward an artistic ideal. What prevents Cardillac from
acknowledging irony is the delusion that he cannot strive to become better as a being in a
way that would manage both his creative and destructive drives. Cardillac’s Hegelian
stance on the nullification of irony is a delusion since he is claiming to have achieved an
ideal state of being by becoming the possessor of his works. If that had been the case, he
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would have experienced transcendence in the act of retrieving his jewelry and would
have been able to stop the murderous behavior altogether. While the means of achieving
the ideal state matter, Cardillac is rejecting responsibility for the negative aspects of his
actions since he maintains that the control is not his, but rather the opposing forces of the
„böser Stern“ and the saintly Scuderi.
The manner in which Cardillac attempts to maintain an ideal of artistic purity that
ultimately results in death and infamy among those involved reflects a negative attitude
toward Idealism’s dependence on the Self reaching a state of perfection that can only be
within its control. Cardillac, as a Hegelian aesthetician, fails as an artist since, although
he appears to be yearning and constantly striving toward a goal, he continues to see that
goal as the final end product where all issues will be resolved and he can live in peace. It
is not so much that Cardillac has failed, but that the Idealist system has failed him,
preventing him from moving forward in his endless journey. Cardillac has the drive and
the talent to be an ideal artist, but the belief that he can transcend his limitations to reach
the ideal state of self-consciousness by controlling reality on his own terms allows no
room for him in the finite world. Cardillac’s death is inevitable because he has never
learned to accept the shortcomings of those who do not share his ideals nor to live among
others in the physical world. By rejecting irony and obsessively trying to reach a state of
totality, Cardillac is dwelling in subjectivity that believes it perceives itself through the
Other, but denies that he can do anything about the Other’s presence in his life.
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Chapter 2: Rat Krespel
At first glance, E.T.A. Hoffmann's 1818 novella Rat Krespel does not leave the
impression that the story is about a dedicated Romantic artist. The titular character
himself is identified by no other name than Rat Krespel, with the word Rat describing his
profession as a legal counselor. The use of Krespel’s professional title without explicit
focus on his career in the story indicates that Krespel as a protagonist has a double
character in which the opposing forces of the logical, legal world and the fanciful nature
of his artistic whims are constantly at odds with one another.
Rat Krespel is not an artist in the traditional sense. He is not a professional artist
who has built a career around the production of art, but instead holds a post as a legal
counselor, a profession considered to be dull and uncreative. Despite his professional
choices, Krespel is a continuously-producing artist, specifically as a maker of violins.
While Krespel does not create violins from scratch, he indiscriminately dismantles
functioning, oftentimes precious violins to discover their secrets and to make a new violin
out of the various parts at his disposal. He then plays the violin he has created for an hour
or two until he is satisfied with the knowledge he has gained from the endeavor and puts
the violin down, never to pick it up again. This process of destruction, creation and
discarding categorizes Krespel as a striving being. In this way he is an artist that creates
and appreciates his work in the present, but acknowledges that there is something better
awaiting

him

in

the

next

artistic
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production.

According

to

Friedrich

Schlegel, the work itself is a search for knowledge (Wissen), and Schlegel, like Schelling,
realizes that knowledge cannot be regarded as a mere object attained through reason, and
that the striving (Streben) after knowledge demands an investigation into the conceptual
tools employed in the inquiry (qtd. in Sculte-Sasse 165-66). Krespel’s continuous process
of disassembling the violins and using the parts to construct something new with its own
unique qualities is a search for knowledge that is employed by the medium of art. This
search for knowledge in which one’s artistic ability is broadened in the production of a
newer, and presumably improved work of art reflects the Romantic standard of infinite
progression toward a state of self-consciousness (Frank 107-08). It is not only in the
production of violins that Krespel is marked as the striving artist; Krespel’s other
endeavors in his daily life imply that he never ceases to be an artist. This tendency is
noted in the opening event of the novella in which Krespel takes charge of the
construction of his own house. Granted the financial resources from a prince to build the
house according to his own tastes, Krespel takes full artistic advantage of the situation.
Instead of entrusting decisions concerning the method of building the house to the hired
construction crew, Krespel takes on the role of the foreman and orders the crew to simply
build the four walls of the house until he has decided that they are high enough. Once the
walls have reached a height that is satisfactory to Krespel’s aesthetic vision, he orders
them to stop. After that, Krespel begins to move around the garden in an erratic matter
that appears to be an exaggerated display of his artistic mind at work, as elaborated in the
following:
[Krespel] lief nach einem Ende des Gartens und schritt dann langsam auf
sein Viereck los, dicht an der Mauer schüttelte er unwillig den Kopf, lief
nach dem andern Ende des Gartens, schritt wieder auf das Viereck los und
machte es wie zuvor. Noch einige Male wiederholte er das Spiel, bis er
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endlich, mit der spitzen Nase hart an die Mauer anlaufend, laut schrie:
‚Heran, heran, ihr Leute, schlagt mir die Tür ein, schlagt mir eine Tür ein!‘
- Er gab Länge und Breite genau nach Fuß und Zoll an, und es geschah,
wie er geboten. (32)
Krespel continues the process with the windows until the house is finished under his
specifications. Considering that Krespel has not consulted a builder to make plans for his
house, but rather impulsively makes the decisions concerning his house in the moment,
reflects an artistic impulse that is unfettered by predetermined planning and conventional
structure. Krespel becomes the artistic force behind the creations that characterize his life,
especially behind the building of the house, which itself serves as a personalized space
where he can constantly create his violins and improve upon his individual development
as an artist.
Krespel’s lack of limitations is exemplified in the scene with the Professor’s
niece; after eating a meal of rabbit meat, Krespel takes the bones that remain and makes a
toy for the little girl. Krespel is an artist who never ceases in pursuit of art, even in
situations where a need to produce is not demanded, but rather, unconscious. Krespel’s
violin-building, house construction, and other minor acts of creation are reminiscent of
Friedrich Schlegel's concept of the Wechselgrundsatz, or alternating principle, in which
the striving individual is “always in some condition of self-identity (as a relatively closed
condition of knowledge), and [the individual] overstep[s] this condition (as our past)
always in the direction of a future” (Frank 181). Schlegel maintains that a starting point is
not something certain, and that the aesthetic condition itself is one that can be infinitely
employed (qtd. in Frank 183). By treating not only his hobby of violin building, but also
moments in this daily life that do not necessarily focus on art as a means to progress in
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his development as an artist, Krespel proves himself to be the continuously striving
individual who is focused on aesthetics for the sake of self-improvement.
Krespel displays his Romantic imagination via representation. Fichte views
imagination as a transition point between the concrete individual and the purely
determinable infinite. Schlegel also perceives imagination to act as a mediator between
oppositions within the Self. These views confirm imagination’s role in German
Romanticism as the “ideal middle joint (Mittelglied) or medius terminus, inserted
between the notion of the infinitude of the highest and that of the sensible finitude,
imagination drafts an image of that which otherwise would remain unpresentable” (Frank
207). Rat Krespel most notably displays his imagination in the form of his music. During
his tormented marriage with Angela, he mentions to the narrator that he was in the habit
to reverting to music to alleviate his woes at the fact that Angela would not acknowledge
their marriage publicly and that her profession brought many unwelcome male visitors
into her presence. Krespel improvises on his violin, presumably transferring his own
emotional state into a more concrete form, that is, of music. In this way, Krespel attempts
to reach some form of transcendence in his unhappy moments. While he has not reached
transcendence, it is evident that he intends to move past his present unhappy situation to
something higher than himself through the medium of art. In this manner, Krespel
actively attempts to fuse the finite with the infinite. The violins themselves become a
symbol of Krespel’s relationship with Angela. While Krespel was a talented musician in
his youth before he has met Angela, he does not begin constructing violins until after the
incident when he throws her out of the window. Krespel does not explain to the narrator
exactly how or why the violin construction came about as a hobby, but Krespel makes
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subtle references to the role of the violins in relation to his issues with Angela. After
Krespel does throw Angela out of the window, an event that seems to have cured her of
her wantonness, he immediately returns to Germany. Krespel is so perturbed by his act
that he resists all temptation to see her and their daughter, Antonie. While Krespel desires
to meet his daughter, the thought of encountering Angela after what he has done to her is
enough for him to stay away from them both, even after they move to Germany. Instead,
he „blieb zu Hause unter seinen zerschnittenen Geigen sitzen“ (47), indicating that the
construction of the violins is the artistic manner in which he maintains a balance between
the monstrous side of both himself and Angela. He has already confirmed his belief to the
narrator that if he sees Angela again, the possibility exists that „der böse Geist [erhält]
wieder Kraft und Macht über Angela...“, forcing him to ask himself „was soll ich nun in
gleichen Falle tun? was ist mir noch übrig?“ (46). Krespel doubts that he can control
himself around Angela, and Angela around him. It can be argued that Krespel uses music
from violins, both the ones he acquires in their complete form, and the ones that he
creates out of pieces of whole violins, as a means to represent his Romantic imagination
in the face of this internal discord that he has concerning his history with Angela.
According to Friedrich Schlegel, the imagination is not purely connected to the subjective
realm, but rather consists of activity that is in a constant state of becoming (Schulte-Sasse
168). Krespel acknowledges that he is not ready to see Angela again, and instead attempts
to merge the duality between himself and Angela, who can be seen here as the Other, into
an artistic form. This reflects Schelling's concept of the sign, that is, the Other as an
image formed by the Self (qtd. in Schulte-Sasse 54). Krespel uses these violins to attain
the area between the concrete and finite condition of his discord with Angela to represent
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the sensuous feeling of the infinite that he cannot otherwise articulate. It is no surprise
that Krespel does not attempt to put his feelings into words for the narrator; it is
something that he cannot articulate, therefore he lets his violins as instruments of artistic
representation, both as a physical constructed product and an auditory product, elaborate
the point for him.
The German Romantics were constantly looking to a point in the future when all
oppositions such as imagination versus reality, mind versus mater, the real of
metaphysics versus the material world of reality will have been transcended (Röder 10).
When this point occurs, all oppositions will have been reconciled. Krespel not only uses
art to find the balance between his finite situation and his infinite soul, but he also
recognizes the possibility for transcendence in art. Krespel’s language uses extremes
when speaking about art with terms such as „Satan“, „Hölle“, „Engel des Himmels“.
Such vocabulary suggests that Krespel acknowledges a side of art that moves past the
reality of Diesseits to that of Jenseits. In addition to utilizing such words, Krespel has
strong reactions to experiences that appear to take him beyond reality and into a form of
transcendence. When Krespel hears Antonie sing for the first time, the ethereal quality of
Antonie’s voice brings him to tears and moves him to the point that he begs her to stop
singing. Krespel recognizes the transcendent quality of Antonie’s singing, saying, „Der
Klang von Antonies Stimme war ganz eigentümlich und seltsam, oft dem Hauch der
Äolsharfe, oft dem Schmettern der Nachtigall gleichend. Die Töne schienen nicht Raum
haben zu können in der menschlichen Brust“ (48). The means to transcend the finite to
the infinite is further represented in the violin that mimics Antonie’s voice. Instead of
tearing this violin apart, Antonie prompts Krespel to play it. Krespel senses something
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different about the violin and obeys his daughter, allowing them to discover that it
produces a beautiful sound that can replace Antonie’s voice. Krespel acknowledges the
violin’s potential to allow the individual to transcend to an ideal state of being, but he
does not dare investigate further, seemingly out of fear of losing the ethereal quality of
the violin’s sound altogether. This acknowledgment has a place in the Romantic concept
of mimesis, in which an object mirrors the world in a positive and revelatory sense
whereby art is a source of ever-renewable articulations (Bowie, From Romanticism 84).
In this way, the violin functions as the proof that the power of Antonie’s voice is not
some subjective reality that is built up by an adoring father, but rather an artistic ideal
that can be found in multiple forms at various points in time, thereby maintaining
transcendence as a continuous activity rather than one occurrence of aesthetic beauty in
the present moment. Krespel’s description of Antonie’s voice and her doctor’s
confirmation that Antonie has an organic defect that both causes the ethereal quality of
her voice and will ultimately kill her indicate that Antonie is not meant to last long in the
material world. Antonie is also the harmonious equalizer between her parents. She is a
talented singer just as Angela was, but Krespel remarks of Antonie’s singing „nie hatte er
Angela so singen hören,“ (47-48) indicating that the daughter has surpassed the mother in
terms of artistic representation. She also does not possess „die hässliche Kehrseite“ of
Angela, which inspires a loving bond between Krespel and Antonie that in turn motivates
him to act in what he perceives to be her best interests. Antonie helps Krespel to reach a
satisfactory state of being where the memory of Angela no longer afflicts him, which
means that Antonie’s predicament in the novella will have drastic implications for
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Krespel as an artist functioning under a system that depends on the occurrence of a
transcendent event.
2.1 FREEDOM IN AUTONOMY
By the standards of German idealism, the condition of the true artist is marked by
the acknowledgment of aesthetic freedom. According to Schiller, freedom is not reliant
on deductive principles, but instead is based on aesthetic reflection, which stems from the
Kantian principle that freedom does not make the individual above the laws of society,
but rather materializes from within the autonomous being (Riou 76-77). What restricts
freedom, however, is acquiescence to the passions. Hegel describes the passions as
„beschränkt und fesselt die Seele in sich selbst, beengt sie zu einer begrenzten
Konzentration und läßt sie dadurch verstummen, einsilbig werden oder ins Blaue und
Wilde hinein toben und rasen“ (Hegel, Ästhetik I 404). Hegel maintains that the spirit
does not have to be burdened by the passions, but with „die Größe des Gemüts, die Kraft
des Geistes erhebt sich über solche Beschränktheit und schwebt in schöner, stiller Ruhe
über dem bestimmten Pathos, von dem sie bewegt wird“ (404). The spirit must find a
way to maintain peace within itself, which marks true freedom. The manner in which the
subject achieves „Erhebung“ over his senses is through means of artistic occupation since
„Ein kräftiger, adeliger Geist, preßt die Klage als solche zurück, hält den Schmerz, die
Verzweiflung unmittelbar herauszuschreien und sich dadurch die Freiheit, in dem tiefen
Gefühl des Leidens selber sich noch mit Weitabliegendem in der Vorstellung zu tun zu
machen und in diesem Entfernten sich sein eigenes Schicksal im Bilde auszusprechen“
(Hegel, Ästhetik I 406). German Idealism therefore determines freedom as aesthetic
reflection that is defined by self-mastery, which also hints at the potential for the
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transcendence of the subject. Rat Krespel gives the initial impression that he understands
freedom in the scene where he is playing out the woes of his marriage to Angela on the
violin. Krespel has found a coping mechanism from which he can lift himself above the
influence of the passions and maintain solace through his art, thereby functioning as an
autonomous being who has the potential to move past his present situation. At the same
time, however, it is clear that Krespel has a lot to learn about freedom since that same
scene concludes with his reverting back to his passions and throwing Angela out of the
window in a moment of rage. Krespel is so shaken by the event that he flees to Germany
and begins to build violins as a way to cope with the passion that he cannot control.
Krespel’s avoidance of Angela can be seen as a method by which he further ensures his
freedom since he is no longer in an environment in which he is tempted to succumb to his
passions to that degree for a second time.
Krespel is given another opportunity to exhibit freedom when the fatal
consequences of the defect in Antonie’s lungs is made known to him by her doctor, a
condition that will kill her if she persists in singing. The news is a burden to Krespel
since, „es war ihm, als hinge zum ersten Male ein schöner Baum die wunderherrlichen
Blüten in sein Leben hinein, und der solle recht an der Wurzel zersägt werden, damit er
nie mehr zu grünen und zu blühen vermöge“ (48). Since Antonie’s singing has
transcendent qualities, Krespel is conflicted between preserving Antonie’s life and
preserving her art. Krespel attempts to master his own passions by means that are not
strictly artistic, but do reflect his respect for the autonomous force behind artistic
production. He does this by recognizing Antonie’s role as an autonomous being and gives
her the freedom to make a choice telling her of the consequences of further singing. It is

33

then that Krespel „stellte ihr die Wahl, ob sie dem Bräutigam folgen und seiner und der
Welt Verlockung nachgeben, so aber früh untergehen, oder ob sie dem Vater noch in
seinen alten Tagen nie gefühlte Ruhe und Freude bereiten, so aber jahrelang leben wolle“
(48). Krespel gives Antonie the opportunity to exhibit self-mastery with this choice.
Antonie initially gives up on singing, leaves her composer fiancé, and moves with
Krespel to his town. When the composer B... follows them and asks to see Antonie,
Antonie changes her mind and sings for B... one last time, prepared for the consequences
that may arise from her decision. Her words „Nur einmal ihn sehen und dann sterben“
(49) indicate an abuse of freedom within the Idealist system since the decision appears to
be influenced by the passions rather than by self-mastery. Krespel is disturbed by this
decision, but begrudgingly allows Antonie to make that choice. The event proves to be
near-fatal, confirming the harmful potential by which passions can lead the artist astray
by being self-destructive. After Antonie recovers, she says to Krespel „Ich will nicht
mehr singen, aber für dich leben“ (50). Antonie’s passions are thus subdued since she
associates singing with her fiancé and death. Antonie attempts to adopt a method by
which she can find artistic freedom within her self-mastery. She helps Krespel build
violins, and finally is able to experience artistic beauty in the single violin that has its
own transcendent quality. By these means she retains a balance between the finite reality
in which succumbing to the passions will result in her own destruction, and the infinite
nature of the aesthetic beauty her talent evokes.
While it seems that the choice to sing or not to sing is completely Antonie’s, there
are conflicting comments throughout the novella that indicate that the situation has taken
its own definition of freedom. After the near-fatal episode with B..., Krespel appears to
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be the one who is running Antonie’s life in all matters, especially that of singing. This is
made clear from the Professor's description of Krespel’s relationship with Antonie:
...so viel ist gewiß, dass er das arme Mädchen auf die gehässigste Weise
tyrannisiert. Er bewacht sie wie der Doktor Bartolo im ‚Barbier von
Sevilien’ seine Mündel; kaum darf sie sich am Fenster blicken lassen.
Führt er sie auf inständiges Bitten einmal in der Gesellschaft, so verfolgt
er sie mit Argusblicken und leidet durchaus nicht, dass sich irgendein
musikalischer Ton hören lasse, viel weniger dass Antonie singe, die
übrigens auch in seinem Hause nicht mehr singen darf. (37)
This depiction of Krespel's relationship with Antonie hardly seems like one of freedom.
Now that she has been given a choice and has used it to reach an end that almost allowed
her to transcend the material world completely through death, Krespel will not allow her
to make that choice again. According to Hegel, however, Krespel's supposed tyranny
over Antonie is more of an indicator of freedom to develop into a rational and responsible
individual. Freedom is not simply about a choice, but also about being educated on how
to live rationally. Hegel continues his discussion of freedom in the context of the state
and the family unit, in which there is a head of the unit and the rest have duties to the
head of the state or the head of the family that are not considered restrictive to freedom
since restrictions put on people are meant to educate them. Hegel maintains that freedom
is still found in the relationship between parents and children since the upbringing of
children reflects freedom when the parents use reason in the endeavor, as stated in the
following:
[Die] Erziehung [der Kindern] hat die in Rücksicht auf das
Familienverhältnis positive Bestimmung, daß die Sittlichkeit in ihnen zur
unmittelbaren, noch gegensatzlosen Empfindung gebracht [werde] und das
Gemüt darin, als dem Grunde des sittlichen Lebens, in Liebe, Zu trauen
und Gehorsam sein erstes Leben gelebt habe, – dann aber die in Rücksicht
auf dasselbe Verhältnis negative Bestimmung, die Kinder aus der
natürlichen Unmittelbarkeit, in der sie sich ursprünglich befinden, zur
Selbständigkeit und freien Persönlichkeit und damit zur Fähigkeit, aus der
natürlichen Einheit der Familie zu treten, zu erheben (Hegel, Philosophie
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des Rechts 158).
Krespel’s treatment of Antonie’s artistic lifestyle reflects the Hegelian concept of
freedom. Being the head of his small family, Krespel has every right to make decisions
for Antonie that are considered for her own benefit. Antonie, as a member of that family
unit, would be functioning within the Hegelian standard of freedom by obeying Krespel,
even if she as an individual desires to act contrary to her father's wishes. By being
educated to live her life rationally, she gains true freedom since this education
idealistically will mold her into a rational being. Since Krespel acknowledges the
difficulties that Antonie has in being forbidden to sing, he takes care to avoid all music
with the exception of his constructed violins. When they discover the violin with the
defect, Krespel realizes that the violin is a tool that can be used to help Antonie find
liberation through art in spite of her withdrawal from artistic production. When the pair
discover the violin with the defect, Krespel remarks that „Seit dieser Zeit kam eine große
Ruhe und Heiterkeit in [Antonies] Leben. Oft sprach sie zum Rat: ‚Ich möchte wohl
etwas singen, Vater!‘ Dann nahm Krespel die Geige von der Wand und spielte Antoniens
schönste Lieder, sie war recht aus dem Herzen froh“ (50). Antonie’s association of the
violin with herself and the satisfaction she finds in hearing it allows Krespel to continue
to believe that he is providing Antonie with all that she needs to live a rationally free and
satisfying existence.
In spite of the harmony and the calm between Antonie and her father in the face
of his control over her, the Idealist concept of freedom is doomed to fail in the artist. This
is shown when story to takes a sudden turn and Krespel either sees or dreams that
Antonie is singing a beautiful aria while her fiancé is accompanying her on the piano. It
is clear that Antonie is ultimately unable to maintain the static state of appreciating art
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without producing it herself. In spite of her comment „Ach, das bin ich ja - ich singe ja
wieder“ (50) in reaction to the first tones she hears from the violin, her face in death, after
the supposed concert between herself and B..., leaves her lying „mit geschlossenen
Augen, mit holdselig lächelndem Blick, die Hände fromm gefaltet, auf dem Sofa, als
schliefe sie und träume von Himmelswonne und Freudigkeit. Sie war aber tot“ (51). This
description of Antonie’s final appearance in death indicates that, although her father’s
idea of freedom is idealistic in that it attempts to manifest itself artistically from within in
a rational manner, she has found her own peace and freedom through the instability that
is associated with the defect in her lungs. Condemned to die if she continues to utilize the
artistic talent that nature bestowed upon her, she at first turns away from passion, but then
returns to it twice. Antonie is not satisfied with the static state of preservation without
artistic production, so she rejects her father’s freedom within Idealism and adopts a
Romantic principle of freedom, resulting in her happy death.
Even Hegel admits that freedom, in establishing a relation of the Self to its Other,
works in a model that has a weak side in which the Other can too easily emerge once
again as a Jenseits. This means that the model, while promoting stability, is not
guaranteed to be stable. Early Romantic thinking requires that the subject overcomes
differences within its being. This type of overcoming helps the subject move toward
indifference, which enables the subject to preserve its differentiation in the Self and the
Other (Schulte-Sasse, 53). This sentiment reflects the Romantic emphasis on freedom as
a concept that does not necessarily work on stability. German Idealism insists that
freedom can only truly function within the individual, and that sentiment is not false. At
the same time, the German Idealists describe their version of freedom as one with
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limitations. The Romantics, on the other hand, encourage freedom without structure,
regardless of the consequences. Friedrich Schlegel’s vision of the Self departs from
German Idealism by maintaining that the individual is never completely present. For this
reason, “The Being-in-itself (An-sich-Sein), which the reflexive I can never get a look at,
is expressed ex negativo as freedom; insofar as it cannot establish itself in its infinitude
but rather must always strive to more beyond its limits, never able to remain absorbed in
its identity with its respective condition” (Frank 179). With this reasoning, it is clear that
Krespel’s efforts to protect Antonie from certain death via the Idealist notion of freedom
that is static and stabile could not succeed in the face of artistic representation that
requires uncertainty beyond the present. Antonie realizes her potential to move past the
finite into the infinite, and embraces it openly. Krespel, on the other hand, is not willing
to sacrifice his daughter for the sake of art, and his perceived solution of the defective
violin as a suitable substitute for striving artistic representation is not enough to contain
his daughter. Had she obeyed his instruction as a father and lived her life rationally, she
would have been denied that transcendent moment that gives her heavenly satisfaction
unto death, which would have served no purpose to either of them. Hoffmann uses the
events leading up to Antonie’s death to show how, when one attempts to be rational and
to force fate to have a certain outcome, the resulting limitation on art is not beneficial to
the subject. Antonie, possessing much artistic potential, but encouraged to only observe a
beautiful work of art rather than to be the creator of that art herself, is unsatisfied with her
condition and decides to defy the stability that allows her to hold onto life, but denies her
the part of her Self that can achieve that single moment of transcendence via art. Krespel,
on the other hand, contains Antonie in the material world, thereby missing out on the
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moment of transcendence when it comes. Krespel is enough of an artist to understand and
accept the significance of Antonie’s death in terms of striving; he allowed her to risk
death the first time she sang for B... in Krespel’s house. It is immediately after that
experience, however, that Krespel’s fatherly qualities prevail and he repeatedly
suppresses Antonie’s artistic drive from within, as evidenced by his reaction to the
narrator when the narrator prompts Antonie to sing. Krespel experiences some type of
transcendent event on the night of her death, but he is uncertain whether it is a dream or
reality. At the climax of the event in which Antonie and her fiancé embrace, Krespel
loses consciousness, indicating that he is barred from the revelation of the secrets
contained in that moment of transcendence. By adjusting the concept of freedom so that it
fits with his idealistic notions, Krespel’s attempts to force an ideal that satisfies his role as
a loving father and keeps his daughter alive fail since art ultimately must move beyond
the limitations of reality.
2.2 END OF THE NEED FOR ART
The aim of German Idealism is the self-consciousness of the subject that will
result in the realization of the Ideal. At this point of transcendence, the means to get to
the goal are no longer needed since the goal itself has been reached. If the artist perceived
that he had attained the Ideal, this would cause an end to the need for art.
Rat Krespel is initially characterized as a continuously creating being, and that his
art maintains its character of striving by his constructing violins and playing on them.
Krespel exhibits this penchant for creating from his early years until the moment of
Antonie’s death. At this point, the narrator notes behavior from Krespel that indicates he
has stopped striving altogether since he no longer has the need for artistic production. His
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appearance on the day of Antonie’s funeral indicates that art has lost its function in his
life since he had „Um den Leib... ein schwarzes Degengehenk geschnallt, doch statt des
Degens einen langen Violinbogen hineingesteckt“ (41). Krespel believes that the moment
of transcendence occurred with the events that led up to Antonie’s death. This is
confirmed by his description of what happened to the violin that mimicked Antonie’s
voice: „als sie starb, zerbrach mit dröhnendem Krachen der Stimmstock in jener Geige,
und der Resonanzboden riß sich auseinander. Die Getreue konnte nur mit ihr, in ihr
leben; sie liegt bei ihr im Sarge, sie ist mit ihr begraben worden“ (42). Krespel recognizes
a final manifestation of the Ideal by laying both Antonie and the violin to rest together.
While the act of burying the violin with Antonie does not necessarily prove that Krespel
has given up on art, his behavior when the narrator cries out in reaction to the news of
Antonie’s death shows this:
Nun trat er in die Mitte des Zimmer, riß den Violinbogen aus dem
Gehenke, hielt ihn mit beiden Händen über den Kopf und zerbrach ihn,
daß er in viele Stücke zersplitterte. Laut lachend rief Krespel: ‚Nun ist der
Stab über mich gebrochen, meinst du, Söhnchen? nicht wahr? Mitnichten,
mitnichten, nun bin ich frei - frei - frei - Heisa frei! - Nun bau ich keine
Geigen mehr - keine Geigen mehr - heisa keine Geigen mehr.‘ (42)
Krespel’s declaration that he will no longer build violins appears to be either madness or
the reaction of a grieving father who puts the blame of his child’s death on art. Under the
circumstances, one would expect Krespel’s decision to be overturned after he had
finished mourning. On the contrary, after the shock of Antonie’s death has passed,
Krespel resumes his other activities as if nothing traumatic had happened. He maintains
to the Professor that „[Krespel] niemals mehr Violinen bauen und auch auf keiner jemals
mehr spielen wolle. Das hat er, wie [der Erzähler] später erfuhr, gehalten“ (43). Krespel
also declares that he is free, no longer bound by the act of building violins. The violin
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bow in the scene following Antonie’s funeral also reinforces the idea of the end of art;
Krespel places the bow in his sword belt, signifying its place as a weapon or a tool by
which one reaches the goal of one’s vocation in life. In Krespel’s case, his vocation is
artistic representation via violin construction and playing. By destroying the violin bow
in the grandiose manner described by the narrator, Krespel is symbolically declaring that
art has come to an end at this point in his existence, and that the tool is no longer needed.
Krespel not only destroys the tool by which he creates his art, but also implies that
he is beyond the finite condition that required him to be a striving artist. He alludes to his
person as having reached an infinite state of being when he shouts to the narrator in a rant
that his behavior has come from the realization that „weil ich mir vor einiger Zeit einen
Schlafrock anfertigte, in dem ich aussehen wollte wie das Schicksal oder wie Gott!“ (4243). Krespel has deemed himself to be on a different plane of existence at this point in the
novella, which stands in complete contrast to his description of the state he was in before
Antonie’s death, when he heard her sing for the first time and felt that he was
experiencing the heavenly. The Professor reinforces this idea with the comment „Was auf
der Erde steigt, gibt [Krespel] wieder der Erde, aber das Göttliche weiß er zu bewahren;
und so steht es mit seinem innern Bewußtsein recht gut“ (43). Krespel, while appearing to
be fixed in a finite condition, appears to go beyond it and to live that infinite condition
internally. His old friend’s observation, as well as Krespel’s own self-comparison with
God or destiny, shows a perceived shift from striving to a state of transcendence. Taking
this into consideration, it seems to be no surprise that the story of Antonie’s death is the
last thing that is related in the novella. Structured within the story-within-a-story, the
relation of the dreamlike experience, followed by the discovery of Antonie’s smiling
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corpse on the sofa ends the narrative without any other conclusion, almost as if there is
no need for a resolution after it. Even the events that follow Antonie’s death precede the
telling of these events, as if the death itself is the end-point beyond which nothing else
can be achieved.
Krespel’s declaration that he no longer has a need for art since he has reached a
perceived ideal state via transcendence is justified by Schelling’s system of
transcendental idealism, which attempts to fuse the subjective and objective nature of the
individual into a harmony that will eventually attain the Ideal by one single act of selfconsciousness. A component of German Idealism is transcendental idealism, which is a
system of all knowledge that finds unity in their opposing parts, and this knowledge
becomes part of consciousness through aesthetics. While German Idealism focuses on the
arrival at the ideal of self-consciousness, transcendental idealism emphasizes the balance
of subjective and objective components of being needed to enable the individual to
transcend beyond reality to the ideal. According to Schelling, the artist is capable of
transcendence when he looks at a completed work of art and feels an „unendliche
Befriedigung,“ which is an indication of the objective real and the subjective ideal, and of
the unconscious and conscious. Schelling maintains that while it is not actually known,
there is an actual reality that is constituted by one absolute act of self-consciousness that
is revealed to the individual ego through aesthetic intuition:
Wenn [das Ideal] in der Produktion erreicht ist, so muß das Produzieren
absolut aufhören, und es muß dem Produzierenden unmöglich sein weiter
zu produzieren, denn die Bedingung alles Produzierens ist eben die
Entgegensetzung der bewußten und der bewußtlosen Tätigkeit, diese
sollen hier aber absolut zusammentreffen, es soll also in der Intelligenz
aller Streit aufgehoben, aller Widerspruch vereinigt sein. (Schelling 285)
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Schelling’s concept of transcendence no longer requires art since that point of existence
provides solutions to all of the problems that arose in the finite state of being. The idea
that art plays a role in the finite condition, but is no longer needed when transcendence
occurs is reinforced by Hegel’s idea on how art reaches such a height of existence that it
ultimately transcends itself:
...die allgemeine Kunst des in sich freigewordenen, nicht an das äußerlichsinnliche Material zur Realisation gebunden Geistes, der nur im inneren
Raume und der inneren Zeit der Vorstellungen und Empfindungen sich
ergeht. Doch gerade auf dieser höchsten Stufe steigt nun die Kunst auch
über sich selbst hinaus, indem sie das Element versöhnter Versinnlichung
des Geistes verläßt und aus der Poesie der Vorstellung in die Prosa des
Denkens hinüber tritt. (Hegel, Ästhetik I 94)
With this transcendence, it is further maintained that, „Uns gilt die Kunst nicht mehr als
die höchste Weise, in welcher die Wahrheit sich Existenz verschafft“ (Hegel, Ästhetik I
110) since art does not go beyond transcendence. The logic behind Schelling’s and
Hegel’s philosophies justifies Krespel’s act of giving up on violin-making since the
transcendent state no longer requires art.
While Krespel’s renunciation of art appears to be a triumph within German
Idealism, it stands in opposition to German Romanticism. As observed by Andrew
Bowie, even the early Romantics had come to the conclusion that “the greatest art is not
great because we know all about why it is great, but because it compels us to keep
coming back to it. There is, therefore, no ‘closure’ with regard to art, and this is not a
deficiency” (Bowie, German Philosophy 99). Art cannot end, just as the artist cannot
cease in pursuing an ideal through artistic representation. Without a truth to pursue,
existence itself would lose its significance since “Perhaps it is the very fact that we
cannot cease questioning that is the source of value in our existence, rather than the hope
that we will arrive at final answers” (Bowie, German Philosophy 100).
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Unlike Cardillac in Das Fräulein von Scuderi, Rat Krespel does not suffer a
physical death, but he does suffer an internal one. Whether or not he is aware of this
death is uncertain, but to go on living after having experienced a moment of pure beauty
is seen by Novalis in his Fichte-Studien as a denial of both the Self and the Other, since
„das reine Ich... ist [nichts] als eine nothwendige Täuschung des mittelbaren Ich allein das aufhören will mittelbares Ich zu seyn und insofern sich selbst widerstrebt“
(Hardenberg 127). Novalis’s observation indicates that Krespel’s rejection of art reflects
the false perception that he has transcended and attained the Ideal. Since it is impossible
to achieve that Ideal, Krespel has in reality achieved nothing and lost the possibility for
doing so by refusing to strive any longer. What allowed Late Romanticism to
differentiate itself from Early Romanticism was the principle that art cannot attain the
Ideal in spite of the artist’s understanding and experiences:
[Das Ideals] Unerreichbarkeit wiederum unterscheidet [das Ideal] vom
Reiz des Interessanten. Da [es] keine Annäherung zuläßt, kann [es] auch
nicht verbraucht werden. [Es] wirkt nicht akut und kurzlebig, sondern
chronisch und konstant. Demgemäß ist auch die Sehnsucht weniger eine
Sucht mit dem unwiderstehlichen Drang nach Befriedigung als ein
gleichmäßig anhaltendes Angeregtsein, das sein Genügen in sich selbst
findet. Sie will darum gar nicht befriedigt werden. (Pikulik 369)
Krespel remained agitated at the fatal consequences of Antonie’s ideal art while she was
living, given that he saw her death and her withdrawal from art as equally undesirable
outcomes. In her death, however, he only finds tranquility even though he himself has
withdrawn from art. The condition of the Romantic artist is not meant to be one in which
he finds a resolution, but rather a condition in which the artist continuously attempts to
balance extremes that come with being grounded in the finite world while aspiring to an
infinite ideal.
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Krespel manipulates the concept of the Ideal by restricting it to German Idealist
principles so that his version of freedom, ruled by parental reason, allows him to keep his
daughter close and to maintain his role as an artist who is still focused on his progression
toward the Ideal via the defective violin. When this endeavor fails him after Antonie
takes her freedom back and dies an aesthetic death that appears to be a realization of the
Ideal, Krespel maintains that art has come to an end and lives a deceitfully satisfying
existence in which he sees himself as a transcendent being that no longer has a need to
create. This existence without art, which maintains Hegel’s theory of the end of art in the
modern era, is a living death in the eyes of the Romantics. While acknowledging the goal
of an ideal state of being, the Romantics maintain that the best the individual can do is to
focus on the means by which he believes the Ideal will be attained. For the artist, art is
the path to the Ideal and consequently should never be abandoned. The philosopher
Friedrich Karl Forberg, impressed by his encounter with Novalis in Jena, expresses the
sentiment that, “[But] is an unreachable goal any less of a goal? Is the view of the
heavens any less enchanting, because it always remains only a view?” (qtd. in Frank 54).
By losing sight of the Ideal through his insistence on having attained it when Antonie
died, Krespel rejects his condition as an artist and lives out his life in denial of an
improved state of being.

45

Conclusion
The German Romantics were focused on discovering the Self in relation to its
Other, which meant that the Self should be able to come to an understanding about both
its potential and its limitations. While the Idealists maintained that the striving subject
should be able to understand itself and overcome its limitations, their philosophy leaves
little room for acceptance of shortcomings. E.T.A. Hoffmann’s writings show an
admiration for the concept of attaining „das Unendliche“ in that the artist’s selfrestriction to an ideal has destructive consequences. In the spirit of German Romanticism,
Hoffmann attempts to show through his fictional artists the use of aesthetics as a means
of reaching an idealized point of existence. His artists strive with a distinct destination in
mind. By allowing his artists to pursue their goals in a manner without compromising
Idealist principles, only then to utterly fail, Hoffmann shows the unforgiving nature of
German Idealism. Consequently, this reveals that transcendence cannot be attained in
practice. This poses the problematic question: what purpose remains for the artist?
One can begin to answer that question by looking back to German Idealism,
which marked a point in philosophy and literary history when the idea of the individual
became the focus. While the individual is revered by Idealists in philosophy and depicted
in artistic works by the Romantics, the path of the individual was a problematic one.
German Idealism made the individual out to be a person who took to principles of selfmastery as if he were capable of reaching an idealized state of being. What the
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Idealists do not mention, however, is the plight of the individual who has attained selfmastery and the difficulties he will face in attempting to show the world how his higher
truth is indeed the truth to follow. Only Friedrich Schiller discusses how the individual
deals with society after he has reached an idealized form of enlightenment:
Zu dem reinen Begriff der Menschheit müssen wir uns also nunmehr
erheben, und da uns die Erfahrung nur einzelne Zustände einzelner
Menschen, aber niemals die Menschheit zeigt, so müssen wir aus diesen
ihren individuellen und wandelbaren Erscheinungsarten das Absolute und
Bleibende zu entdecken und durch Wegwerfung aller zufälligen
Schranken uns der notwendigen Bedingungen ihres Daseins zu
bemächtigen suchen. (Schiller 42-43)
Schiller acknowledges that the artist's role is essential in society's evolution because the
artist has allowed himself to be ennobled and is the only one capable of the task of
leading humanity to the ideal. While the ideal can be realized by and lived through the
individual, it does nothing for humanity unless society as a whole is willing to follow
suit. According to Schiller, the artist has a great responsibility to inspire others:
...so wird [des Künstlers] eigener Adel dort den ihrigen aufwecken und
ihre Unwürdigkeit hier deinen Zweck nicht vernichten... Verjage die
Willkür, die Frivolität, die Rosigkeit aus ihren Vergnügungen, so du sie
unvermerkt auch aus ihren Handlungen, endlich aus ihren Gesinnungen
verbannen. Wo du sie findet, umgib sie mit edeln, mit großen, mit
geistreichen Formen, schließe sie ringsum mit den Symbolen des
Vortrefflichen ein, bis der Schein die Wirklichkeit und die Kunst die Natur
überwindet. (Schiller 37)
The individual must use his enlightenment to influence his unenlightened fellow man,
and he can only do this with a physical representation of the wholeness of nature found
within the beautiful. Beauty will inevitably evoke reactions from those who behold it so
that they will begin to consider their own condition in a critical manner, become
enlightened, and bring society to the ideal of the human condition by means of the
collective development of numerous individuals.
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Hoffmann’s artist emulates Schiller’s idea of an individual who uses art to reach
an improved state of being. The difference between Schiller’s artistic individual, and
Hoffmann’s artist, however, is the way the artist relates to society. Schiller describes the
artistic individual who will inevitably influence those around him by inspiring them with
his own idealized example. Hoffmann’s artist barely considers society in the grand
scheme of things. In a way, Hoffmann’s artist does not have an obligation to change
society with art. The manner in which René Cardillac stands out from the other artists in
17th century Paris in Das Fräulein von Scuderi portrays artistic distance between the
individual and society. The artists, in spite of their lack of talent, attempt to cause change
with their art. While their aims are not exactly idealistic, they understand that art has the
ability to influence society. The portrayal of Cardillac as someone who does not care to
change society with his art shows the artist as a self-contained entity. Rat Krespel does
the same when he realizes that Antonie’s beautiful voice will eventually be her
destruction. As much as he realizes that the world will be missing out on the heavenly
influence of her voice, he does his best to convince her and her fiancé that she should not
even risk going out into the world out of the fear that the urge to sing will become
overpowering.
Hoffmann’s portrayal of the Romantic artist encourages the individual to be
concerned with his own development, and to be self-reflective rather than concerned with
the society around him. Goethe suggests a similar concept in Faust. Eventually
completed as a two-part drama, Faust: Der erster Teil was the only part published during
Hoffmann’s lifetime. The work is centered on Faust’s efforts to experience a moment of
pure satisfaction in which his striving would come to an end and he would want nothing
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more than to linger in that moment of satisfaction. Goethe’s Faust has much to do with
Hoffmann’s understanding of German Romanticism, because it attempts to fuse the ideal
of fulfillment with the individual’s efforts to constantly improve himself in relation to the
Other. Faust’s journey is not fool-proof; as experienced by Hoffmann’s artists, Faust’s
journey to the Ideal carves a path of destruction that affects Gretchen and her family.
Mistakes do not destroy the artist, since even God states „Es irrt der Mensch, solang’ er
strebt“ (Goethe, „Prolog im Himmel“ 317). This means that although the first part of the
play ends in disaster, the second part of the play shows Faust continuing in his journey in
spite of error. What makes the conclusion of Faust remarkable is the fact that the angels
do not claim that Faust has reached the end. They admit that he has reached a point of
satisfaction in his earthly life, but that that point does not mark the end. Faust’s
transcendence is seen as the beginning of a new journey rather than a static state of
satisfaction.
While Hoffmann’s artists mistakenly establish a goal for themselves, Faust only
desires and searches for the destination. Both Cardillac and Krespel remain living,
productive artists as long as they are still searching for their Ideal. When they have come
to a point in which they tell themselves that the Ideal has come or will come, their lives
as artists are disrupted and they are left with a form of non-Being, as exemplified by
Cardillac’s death and Krespel’s apathy. Thus the Romantic artist is not supposed to see
an end to his endeavors, but instead to see his endeavors as the essence that bring the
work its true aesthetic purpose. The real “end” of Romantic striving is the development
of the individual during the journey. The loftiness of Faust’s fate reflects an ideal that can
only be determined by supernatural beings, which means that reaching the Ideal does not
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belong to the human condition, even though the possibility for it can be conceived in the
human consciousness.
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